Het mechanische van de mechanica: Het krachtbegrip tussen metafysica en mechanica van Newton tot Lagrange. J. Christiaan Boudri by van Berkel, Klaas
  
 University of Groningen
Het mechanische van de mechanica: Het krachtbegrip tussen metafysica en mechanica van






IMPORTANT NOTE: You are advised to consult the publisher's version (publisher's PDF) if you wish to cite from
it. Please check the document version below.
Document Version
Publisher's PDF, also known as Version of record
Publication date:
1995
Link to publication in University of Groningen/UMCG research database
Citation for published version (APA):
van Berkel, K. (1995). Het mechanische van de mechanica: Het krachtbegrip tussen metafysica en
mechanica van Newton tot Lagrange. J. Christiaan Boudri. Isis, 86(3), 493-493.
https://doi.org/10.1086/357275
Copyright
Other than for strictly personal use, it is not permitted to download or to forward/distribute the text or part of it without the consent of the
author(s) and/or copyright holder(s), unless the work is under an open content license (like Creative Commons).
Take-down policy
If you believe that this document breaches copyright please contact us providing details, and we will remove access to the work immediately
and investigate your claim.
Downloaded from the University of Groningen/UMCG research database (Pure): http://www.rug.nl/research/portal. For technical reasons the




Reviewed Work(s): Het mechanische van de mechanica: Het krachtbegrip tussen metafysica
en mechanica van Newton tot Lagrange by J. Christiaan Boudri
Review by: Klaas van Berkel
Source: Isis, Vol. 86, No. 3 (Sep., 1995), p. 493
Published by: The University of Chicago Press on behalf of The History of Science Society
Stable URL: https://www.jstor.org/stable/235058
Accessed: 10-12-2018 14:59 UTC
 
JSTOR is a not-for-profit service that helps scholars, researchers, and students discover, use, and build upon a wide
range of content in a trusted digital archive. We use information technology and tools to increase productivity and
facilitate new forms of scholarship. For more information about JSTOR, please contact support@jstor.org.
 
Your use of the JSTOR archive indicates your acceptance of the Terms & Conditions of Use, available at
https://about.jstor.org/terms
The History of Science Society, The University of Chicago Press are collaborating with
JSTOR to digitize, preserve and extend access to Isis
This content downloaded from 129.125.148.19 on Mon, 10 Dec 2018 14:59:44 UTC
All use subject to https://about.jstor.org/terms
 BOOK REVIEWS-ISIS, 86: 3 (1995)
 J. Christiaan Boudri. Het mechanische van de
 mechanica: Het krachtbegrip tussen metafysica
 en mechanica van Newton tot Lagrange. xiv +
 306 pp., illus., figs., bibl., index. Delft: Eburon,
 1994. Dfl 59.90 (paper).
 "The picure of what is perhaps the greatest rev-
 olution in the history of human thought would
 remain incomplete if one started after Coperni-
 cus or ended before Newton, but it would not be
 really enriched if one extended this era in either
 direction." So E. J. Dijksterhuis (in a lecture de-
 livered in 1940) delimited the so-called Scien-
 tific Revolution, which in his view was charac-
 terized by the construction of a mechanical
 world picture and ended with the work of Isaac
 Newton. The development of the science of me-
 chanics in the eighteenth century was considered
 to be not much more than the formalization of
 Newton's Principia. Few historians of science
 still adhere to this positivistic notion of the his-
 tory of eighteenth-century mechanics. It has
 been shown that eighteenth-century discussions
 concerning the foundations of mechanics im-
 plied much more than just a working out of New-
 ton's principles and were closely linked to the-
 ological and metaphysical issues. Now J.
 Christiaan Boudri, in his doctoral dissertation,
 argues that these eighteenth-century discussions
 not only were linked to but essentially were
 metaphysical discussions. There was no wither-
 ing away of metaphysics, but a transformation
 of the metaphysical foundations of mechanics, a
 transformation so fundamental as to justify the
 conclusion that the Scientific Revolution cannot
 be said to have ended with Newton.
 Essential for Boudri's reinterpretation of the
 history of eighteenth-century mechanics are two
 basic distinctions: between a metaphysics of
 substance and a metaphysics of structure, and
 between an explicit and an implicit metaphysics.
 According to Boudri, in eighteenth-century me-
 chanics a metaphysics of substance was replaced
 by a metaphysics of structure. In Aristotelian and
 scholastic mechanics force was regarded as be-
 ing transmitted from one substance to another,
 and in early modem science Isaac Newton and
 G. W. Leibniz still adhered to this metaphysics
 of substance. As far as the metaphysical foun-
 dations of mechanics were concerned, the Sci-
 entific Revolution had yet to begin. It was only
 in the work of Leonhard Euler, Jean d'Alembert,
 P. L. M. de Maupertuis, and J. L. Lagrange that
 a metaphysics of substance was replaced by a
 metaphysics of structure. Lagrange's Mecha-
 nique analitique (1788) was the synthesis of this
 new mechanics.
 At the same time, however, the metaphysical
 foundations of mechanics, explicitly discussed
 by Newton and Leibniz, went into hiding. By
 pushing further the mathematization of mechan-
 ics, d'Alembert and Lagrange hoped to free me-
 chanics from metaphysics. But they did not suc-
 ceed. Any discussion of the foundations of
 mechanics is a form of metaphysics, whether one
 likes it or not. Their effort meant only that the
 new (structural) metaphysics remained implicit.
 This explains why the fundamental changes in
 the metaphysical foundations of mechanics went
 unnoticed by nineteenth- and twentieth-century
 historians of science. They overlooked the re-
 placement of a substantial by a structural meta-
 physics because that metaphysics as such be-
 came implicit rather than explicit.
 This is but a very crude summary of Boudri's
 sophisticated analysis of eighteenth-century
 mechanics. His thesis that eighteenth-century
 discussions of the foundations of mechanics re-
 sulted not in the dismissal but in the transfor-
 mation of metaphysics is perhaps self-evident:
 there can be no science without at least an im-
 plicit metaphysical point of view. What really
 makes Boudri's book worthwhile is the way he
 traces the transformation of mechanics in several
 eighteenth-century debates: the famous vis viva
 controversy, the equally famous discussion con-
 cerning the principle of least action, a 1779 Ber-
 lin prize contest concerning thefundamentum vi-
 rium, and Lagrange's effort to reduce the
 concept of force to its purely mathematical as-
 pect. Especially illuminating is Boudri's con-
 trasting of the responses to the prize contest
 called by the Berlin Academy, which was still
 explicitly concerned with a metaphysics of sub-
 stance but attracted none of the great mechani-
 cists of the day, with the work of Lagrange, who
 by linking masses in space and time implicitly
 reduced force to a structural concept.
 But does this prove that the Scientific Revo-
 lution cannot be said to have ended with New-
 ton? In my view, this is not the case. Mechanics
 was central to the development of science as a
 whole in the seventeenth century, but in the eigh-
 teenth century it had lost ground to other sci-
 ences. Mechanics was more and more becoming
 a science just like any other. A transformation of
 the foundations of mechanics, important though
 it was for mechanics as such, no longer had the
 impact it would have had a century before. With-
 out denying any of the particular theses of
 Boudri, it is still possible to see the history of
 e ghteenth-century mechanics as an aftermath of
 the Scientific Revolution.
 KLAAS VAN BERKEL
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